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NOTES
The RICO Nexus Requirement: A "Flexible" Linkage
In 1970, Congress, responding to what was perceived as an alarming increase in the activities of La Cosa Nostra, 1 enacted the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Reorganization Act (RIC0)2 as part of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. 3 Created during a period
marked by national and legislative paranoia over organized crime,4
RICO was broadly drafted in order to help fill "the gaps" in the enforcement net through which the mob bosses were slipping. 5 For five
years after its passage ·ruco was largely ignored by prosecutors and
1. See McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (S. 30) or Its Critics: Which Threatens Civil
Liberties?, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 55, 55-60 (1970). McClellan describes La Cosa Nostra as a
criminal organization of 26 families that
is directly descended from and is patterned upon the centuries-old Sicilian terrorists society,
the Mafia. This organization, also known as Cosa Nostra, operates vast illegal enterprises
that produce an annual income of many billions of dollars. This combine has so much
power and influence that it may be described as a private government of organized crime.
Id. at 59 (quoting the Final Report of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, infra note
5). McClellan cites syndicated gambling, the importation and distribution of narcotics, and loansharking as the chief activities of this organization.
The threat of organized crime is very real. In 1967, the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement estimated that the economic cost of organized crime is twice that of all other crime
combined. PRESIDENT'S CoMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 31-35 (1967). This same commission
estimated that organized crime annually earned an amount approximately equal to the aggregated incomes of America's ten largest companies. Note, United States v. Sutton: Reining In on
a Runaway RICO, 42 U. PITT. L. REv. 131, 131 (1980).
2. 18 u.s.c. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
3. Pub. L. No. 91452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970).
4. Congress was motivated by extensive evidence leading to the conclusion that organized
crime was a "cancer in our cities," which would require strong measures to combat and
eradicate. The hearings that preceded the Act, including Joseph Valachi's startling disclosures of the organization and scope of the Mafia, led to a nationwide fear that our society's
basic institutions were being eroded by this evil force. The popular reaction was not unlike
the "red scares" that swept the nation in the 1920s and again in the 1950s.
Bradley, Racketeers, Congress, and the Courts: An Analysis of RICO. 65 IOWA L. REv. 837, 837
(1980) (footnotes omitted). See generally Albanese, What Lockheed and La Gosa Nostra Have in
Common: The Effect of Ideology on Criminal Justice Policy, 28 CRIME & DELINQ. 211 (1982)
(containing a general discussion of how the Valachi and Lockheed hearings led to the passage of
new legislation).
5. "The loopholes through which the leaders of organized crime now escape the processes of
our law must be closed. Justice and public safety demand no less, and it is to this end that S.30
was carefully drafted . . . ." McClellan, supra note 1, at 60 (footnote omitted). Congressional
studies indicated that the members of La Cosa Nostra obtained dismissal or acquittal on charges
leveled against them more than twice as often, on a percentage basis, as ordinary criminals. 115
CONG. REc. Sl4430 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1969). The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation
found that
The crime leaders are experienced, resourceful, and shrewd in evading and dissipating
the effects of established procedures in law enforcement. Their operating methods, carefully
and cleverly evolved during several decades of this century, generally are highly effective
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the fervor about organized crime subsided; but the past few years have
witnessed a dramatic increase in the use of Civil and Criminal RIC0 6
as well as in the controversy surrounding the statute.
The potential scope of RICO's broad substantive provisions7 combined with its potent civil8 and criminal9 penalties has led to a vast
body of critical legal scholarship and an equally large mass of confused and often conflicting judicial opinions. 1° Critics argue that as
currently applied, "the statute is too broad and constitutes a snare for
persons and activities within, as well as outside of, the statute's intended coverage." 11 Indeed, a large number of courts have asked prosfoils against diligent police efforts to obtain firm evidence that would lead to prosecution and
conviction.
The crime chieftains, for example, have developed the process of "insulation" to a remarkable degree. The efficient police forces in a particular area may well be aware that a
crime leader has ordered a murder, or is an important trafficker in narcotics, or controls an
illegal gambling network, or extorts usurious gains from "shylocking" ventures. Convicting
him of his crimes, however, is usually extremely difficult and sometimes is impossible, sim·
ply because the top-ranking criminal has taken the utmost care to insulate himself from any
apparent physical connection with the crime or with his hireling who commits it.
PERMANENT SUBCOMMl'ITEE ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERN·
MENT OPERATIONS, ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS, S. REP. No. 72,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1965) [hereinafter cited as PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE].
6. See Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REv. 291, 293 (1983).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982) provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or
indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt
in which such person has participated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18,
United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the
proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation
of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of investment, and
without the intention of controlling or participating in the control of the issuer, or of assist·
ing another to do so, shall not be unlawful under.this subsection if the securities of the issuer
held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or their accomplices in
any pattern or racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt after such purchase
do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding securities of any one class,
and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the
issuer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any
interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of
subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
8. 18
9. 18

u.s.c. § 1964 (1982).
u.s.c. § 1963 (1982).

10. See Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the Prosecutor's Nursery, 49 FORDHAM L. REV.
165 (1980); Tarlow, supra note 6. These two articles discuss RICO in its entirety and canvass the
wide range of judicial opinions and critical writings.
11. Note, RICO: Are the Courts Construing the Legislative History Rather than the Statute
Itself?, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 777, 777 (1980) (emphasis added).
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ecutors to exercise discretion in bringing RICO suits. 12
This Note argues that the RICO "nexus" requirement can be interpreted to limit effectively this overbroad use of RICO without emasculating the statute. The "nexus requirement" is generally described as
defining the word "through" 13 in section 1962(c), the provision of
RICO that makes it illegal to "conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of [an] enterprise's affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity." 14 This language establishes the necessity of
proving a relationship between the enterprise and the racketeering. 15
Once evidence of the alleged enterprise16 and the predicate racketeer12. See United States v. Ivie, 700 F.2d 51, 64-65 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting that warnings against
prosecutorial abuse are not being observed in the Southern District of New York); United States
v. Thordarson, 646 F.2d 1323, 1329 n.10 (9th Cir.) ("Like the Second Circuit we are not unmindful that 'the potentially broad reach of RICO poses a danger of abuse where the prosecutor
attempts to apply the statute to situations for which it was not primarily intended.' We, too,
'caution against undue prosecutorial zeal in invoking RICO.' ") (citations omitted) (quoting
United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1123 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980)), cerL
denied, 454 U.S. 1655 (1981); United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1364 n.8 (8th Cir. 1980)
(Among federal prosecutors, RICO has grown in "popularity beyond the intentions of Congress
by bringing within the sphere of RICO minor offenses and by intruding on state power."), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981). These requests for prosecutorial restraint canbe viewed as judicial
admissions of an inability to provide a coherent and equitable interf>retation of RICO which is
sufficiently limiting. They also can be seen as an admission that the judicial trend toward a broad
interpretation of RICO has become too entrenched to reverse.
There was evidence of this type of judicial impotency in Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343,
1353-56 (7th Cir.), cerL denied, 104 S. Ct. 509 (1983), where the co.urt apologetically reached the
conclusion that RICO had "federalized" the common law of "garden variety business fraud.''
The Court dismissed the defendant's claim that RICO was not intended to federalize all forms of
business fraud but frequently used phrases such as "we are . . . without authority to restrict the
application of the statute.'' 711 F.2d at 1253.
In addition, the American Bar Association Section on Criminal Justice has promulgated a
revised RICO which seeks to limit the undesirable and unintended tendency of the statute to
preempt the common law conspiracy doctrine. Report to the House of Delegates, 1982 A.B.A.
SEC. CRIM. Jusr. REP. 20 (1982). See generally Tarlow, supra note 6, at 295.
13. See, e.g., Tarlow, supra note 10, at 228. Courts have looked for a relationship between
racketeering and the enterprise although they have rarely labeled it as the "nexus requirement."
Often emphasis has been placed on what it means to "conduct or participate" in the affairs of the
enterprise. See, e.g., United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1375 (4th Cir. 1979) (discussed at
notes 49-55 infra and accompanying text), cert denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982). For the full text of this provision, see note 7 supra.
15. United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), affd, 527 F.2d 237 (2d
Cir. 1975), cert denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976).
16. Most of the debate about the scope of RICO has centered around the definition of"enterprise" and this has been the most frequently litigated issue in § 1962(c) cases. The focal point of
any analysis of an "enterprise" problem is the broad and ambiguous definition of enterprise in
§ 1961(4): "[E]nterprise includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other
legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.''
Tarlow, supra note 6, at 324 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982)).
The enterprise issue has been fully dealt with elsewhere. See generally Blakey & Gettings,
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts - Cnininal and Civil
Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1025 n.91 (1980) (surveying the enterprise conflict); Tarlow,
supra note 10, at 199-208; Tarlow, supra note 6, at 324-46; Eighth Circuit Survey - Criminal Law:
RICO: The Illegitimate Stepchild of the Prosecutor's Nursery, 14 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1101
(1981); Note, Elliot v. United States: Conspiracy Law and the Judicial Pursuit of Organized
Crime Through RICO, 65 VA. L. REv. 109 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, Conspiracy Law];
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ing acts has been submitted, the final element of proof must be that the
racketeering and the enterprise are sufficiently related to justify a findNote, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations: Distinguishing the ''Enterprise" Issues, 59
WASH. U. L. Q. 1343 (1982); Comment, Reading the ''Enterprise" Element Back into RICO:
Sections 1962 and 1964(c), 76 Nw. U. L. REv. 100 (1981). While a full discourse on the enterprise issue would not be helpful, the debate does have implications for the nexus requirement.
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981), settled a circuit
split by deciding that the term "enterprise" as defined in § 1961(4) encompasses illegitimate as
well as legitimate enterprises. The Court left open the issue of whether this illegitimate enterprise must have an existence independent of the pattern of racketeering activity. If it must, a
prosecutor cannot define the RICO enterprise as a group organized to commit the racketeering
acts. The circuit courts have not clearly resolved this issue, but the decision by the Eighth Circuit
in United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1372 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912
(1981), holding that the enterprise must have some economic existence apart from the racketeering has gained support.
We hold that Congress intended that the phrase "a group of individuals associated in fact
although not a legal entity," as used in its definition of the term "enterprise" in section
1961(4), to encompass only an association having an ascertainable structure which exists for
the purpose of maintaining operations directed toward an economic goal that has an exist·
ence that can be defined apart from the commission of the predicate acts constituting the
"pattern of racketeering activity."
See also Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1982), on rehearing en bane, affd. in part, revd.
in part, 710 F.2d 1361, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 527 (1983); United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1040 (1982). The most important source of support has come
from the advisory and nonbinding guidelines for prosecutors issued by the Justice Department
which adopted the Anderson approach to the enterprise issue. See Justice Department to Shift
Emphasis from White Collar Area, Giuliani Says, 30 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2238, 2239 (Dec. 23,
1981). For a criticism of these guidelines as being "somewhat opaque," see Blakey & Gettings,
RICO's Problem in the Courts: A Classic Case ofMisreading, Natl. L. J., Mar. 9, 1981, at 28 n.3,
col. 2.
The Anderson approach is correct in that two unacceptable results follow from defining an
enterprise as a group of people joined together solely to commit racketeering acts. First, a broad
reading, such as the one adopted in United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 953 (1978), eliminates the enterprise requirement because establishing the pattern of
racketeering establishes the enterprise. If the definition of enterprise requires a purpose to engage
in racketeering, this in tum eliminates the nexus requirement.
With subsections (b) and (c) [of section 1962], consideration must also be given to the re·
quirement that the defendant operate "through" a pattern of racketeering activity. This
element practically vanishes along with the enterprise element whenever the enterprise is
defined as the association to commit the racketeering activity, but it can pose substantive
limitations on prosecutorial zeal in the setting of infiltration of legitimate business.
Anderson, 626 F.2d at 1366 n.13. This would leave only one element, the pattern of racketeering
activity, to establish any RICO violation, a result contrary to congressional intent.
We must presume, however, that had Congress desired to use RICO to prohibit all racketeering activity in connection with or through the instrumentality of a legitimate enterprise,
it would have done so expressly. In this connection, it is pertinent that RICO's legislative
history reveals a congressional intention to eradicate the infiltration of organized crime and
racketeering into legitimate organizations, and not, in particular, to reach all racketeering
activity which has any connection with a legitimate enterprise.
United States v. Gibson, 486 F. Supp. 1230, 1244 (S.D. Ohio 1980), ajfd., 675 F.2d 825 (6th Cir.
1982); see also United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 1976) (Van Graafeland, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977). See generally Comment, Reading the Enterprise
Element Back into RICO: Sections 1962 and 1964(c), 76 Nw. U. L. REv. 100 (1981).
Secondly, a broad enterprise interpretation amounts to according "the word 'enterprise' • • •
parity with the term 'conspiracy.'" Altese, 542 F.2d at 108 (Van Graafeland, J., dissenting). If
the racketeering activity can be used to define the enterprise then the prosecution can escape the
rigors of common law conspiracy doctrine by invoking RICO. For articles reflecting the concern
that RICO can be used to federalize the common Jaw of conspiracy, see Brickey, Conspiracy,
Group Danger and the Corporate Defendant, 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 431 (1983); Holderman, Recon·
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ing of a RICO violation. Thus, the "nexus" requirement presents the
question of whether RICO should apply in any particular case in
which the central elements of the offense can be shown. Unfortunately, section 1962(c) defines neither the nature of this relationship
nor the degree of involvement necessary for it to exist.
This Note advocates an approach to the "nexus" requirement
which focuses on the extent to which the defendant utilized the "organizational structure" of the enterprise. 17 Rather than attempting to
provide a rigid definition of utilization of organizational structure, it
urges the factfinder to examine a series of factors which are indicative
of enterprise exploitation. Part I of this Note analyzes the various judicial approaches to the nexus issue and argues that they are inadequate largely because of a reliance on rigid definitions. Part II provides
an alternative approach by examining the language of section 1962(c),
the legislative history of RICO and the ordinary conception of organizational crime to establish that the concern of RICO, and particularly
the nexus requirement, is with racketeer utilization -of organization or
enterprise structure. The same material is used to elucidate a nonexhaustive list of indicia of utilization of the enterprise.
I.

THE INADEQUACY OF CURRENT JUDICIAL APPROACHES

A.

The General Approach

Generally, the courts have required the existence of a "sufficient"
or "substantial" nexus or relationship in order to find a RICO violation.18 Unfortunately, the majority of courts using this approach do
ciling RICO's Conspiracy and "Group" Enterprise Concepts with Traditional Conspiracy Doctrine,
52 U. CIN. L. REv. 385 (1983); Note, Conspiracy Law, supra.
,
The nexus requirement is directly affected by the interpretation of the enterprise issue. When
the enterprise is required to be independent of the racketeering activity, as is the case whenever a
legitimate enterprise is alleged or in any· case arising in a jurisdiction that follows United States v.
Anderson, the necessary degree of the relationship between these two elements becomes critical.
"If the racketeering acts need not be related to each other and there is no requirement of a
substantial nexus to the enterprise's affairs, the scope of RICO counts would be virtually unlimited." Tarlow, supra note 6, at 371-72. Given an independent enterprise, the nexus requirement
serves as an important limitation on the scope of § 1962(c).
17. The scope of this Note is limited to "criminal" RICO and cases dealing with prosecutions
under 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982). Since the substantive provision, § 1962, is the same for civil and
criminal RICO this analysis, in theory, should have the same application in the civil area. However, there may be statutory and judicially created differences. See Haroco, Inc. v. American
Natl. Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), cert granted, 105 S. Ct. 902 (1985).
18. See generally United States v. Rubio, 727 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Webster, 639 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1981), modified on rehearing. 669 F.2d 185, cerL denied, 454
U.S. 857 (1982); United States v. Barber, 668 F.2d 778 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 829
(1982); United States v. Bright, 630 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Campanale, 518
F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976). In each of these cases the courts
were content to assert that there was a sufficient nexus without introducing a standard to guide
their decision.
United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), ajfd., 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976), departs from the general trend of requiring a substantial
relationship. Stofsky dealt specifically with the constitutionality of § 1962(c). The defendant
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not define what a "substantial" nexus is, 19 and "substantial" and "sufficient" are not words which are intrinsically helpful. The result of
this failure is an "I know it when I see it" approach20 to RICO which
presents the threat of uneven justice.2 1
The spectre of inconsistent application that arises because of
vagueness and ambiguity cannot be tolerated in a statute as potent as
RIC0. 22 First, the stakes involved are high; a person charged under
criminal RICO faces the potential of a twenty-year sentence, forfeiture
of assets in the alleged enterprise,23 and collateral estoppel if a civil
RICO suit is brought. 24 A guilty verdict in a civil suit can result in
treble damages25 and a variety of remedial2 6 injunctions. Second,
vague language in court-created "tests" or definitions prevents the defendant from adequately preparing a defense27 and creates the possibilargued that RICO was unconstitutionally vague since it failed to specify the relationship required
between the predicate acts and the enterprise. The court agreed that a relationship was required,
see text at note 15 supra, but found that § 1962(c) was not vague; it was just broad.
It is true that the statute does not define this connection by distinguishing between predi·
cate acts which play a major or a minor role, or any role at all, in what might be seen as the
usual operations of the enterprise; nor does it require that such acts be in furtherance of the
enterprise, as defendants suggest it must.
In this Court's view, the statute fails to state these requirements because Congress did
not intend to require them in these terms. The perversion of legitimate business may take
many forms. It plainly says that it places criminal responsibility on both those who conduct
and those who participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise, without regard to what the enterprise was or was not about at the time in question.
409 F. Supp. at 613. Thus, Stofsky implies that no particular relationship is required. See Tarlow, supra note 6, at 371. The Stofsky approach has only rarely been followed. See, e.g., United
States v. Scalzitti, 408 F. Supp. 1014 (W.D. Pa. 1975) and United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), affd., 578 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978).
19. See note 18 supra. The approaches of those courts which have attempted to provide a
standard are discussed in notes 30-61 infra and accompanying text.
20. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). A similar approach has been used to determine a racketeering enterprise injury under 18 U.S.C. § 1964. See
Willamette Sav. & Loan v. Blake & Neal Fin. Co., 577 F. Supp. 1415, 1430 (D. Ore. 1984). See
generally Haroco, Inc. v. American Natl. Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), cert.
granted, 105 S. Ct. 902 (1985).
21. The threat of uneven justice arises when a statute is vague because it is difficult to know
what acts are in fact prohibited. Thus, the courts have broad discretion as to when they will
apply the statute to particular conduct. Indeed, this ambiguity in RICO has precipitated charges
that the statute is unconstitutionally vague because "fundamental principles of due process • • •
mandate that no individual be forced to speculate, at peril of indictment, whether his conduct is
prohibited." Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 112 (1979). See also Tarlow, supra note 10, at
191 n.138; Tarlow, supra note 6, at 309 n.67.
22. Many of the same equitable considerations that Jed to the long-standing rule in favor of a
narrow construction of criminal statutes should require the elimination of vagueness in RICO's
application. See United States v. Branblett, 348 U.S. 503, 509 (1955) ("That criminal statutes are
to be construed strictly is a proposition which calls for the citation of no authority."). For a
discussion of the genesis of the strict construction rule, see Note, RICO and the Liberal Construc·
tion Clause, 66 CoRNELL L. REv. 167 (1980).
23. 18 u.s.c. § 1963 (1982).
24. 18 u.s.c. § 1964(d) (1982).
25. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982).
27. One of the problems of vagueness is that the defendant may be "subjected to •.• com·
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ity that a person may unwittingly violate the statute. 28 Third,
ambiguity may either exaggerate or diminish the deterrent effect of a
criminal statute since it is not clear exactly what type of conduct society is condemning.29 Thus, the substantial relationship approach is
wholly inadequate to implement the RICO prohibitions in a meaningful and effective manner.

B. Attempts at Further Definition
Perhaps in response to the inadequacies of the "substantial relationship" standard described above, the courts have adopted five different identifiable approaches to the nexus requirement in an effort at
further definition. Each formulation offers a black-letter rule defining
the nexus requirement, but for various reasons, each is inadequate.
1.

The ''Solely by Virtue of Position" Test

Of those tests defining a "substantial nexus," the Scotto-Provenzano
rule is the most commonly cited. In United States v. Scotto 30 the court
defines the nexus in two alternative ways:
We think that one conducts the activities of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering when (1) one is enabled to commit the predicate offenses solely by virtue of his position in the enterprise or involvement in
or control over the affairs of the enterprise, or (2) the predicate offenses
are related to the activities of that enterprise. Simply committing predicate acts which are unrelated to the enterprise or one's position within it
would be insufficient.31
The second test simply restates that the statute requires a relationship
without defining the nature of the required nexus. However, there is
some value in the first test because it focuses specifically on the nature
of the relationship required. Notwithstanding, the first test is inadepulsion under a scheme of law whose imprecision in the framing of legal issues is such as to give
the triers of fact a power to invade imperceptibly (and thus unreviewably) a realm of constitutionally protected personal liberties . . . ." Note, The Void.for-Vagueness Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67, 104 (1960).
28. See text at note 11, supra.
29. Ambiguity can chill legitimate conduct and result in overdeterrence because "the individual [is left] to guess at his peril whether he can or cannot be constitutionally punished for violation of the statute," and people therefore will be overly cautious. Note, supra note 27, at 76.
Alternatively, if the statute is extremely ambiguous, there may be a weakening of the intended
deterrent effect because an individual does not even contemplate that her conduct comes within
the statute.
30. 641 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981); see also United States v.
Provenzano, 688 F.2d 194 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1071 (1982).
31. Scotto, 641 F.2d at 54 (emphasis added). See also United States v. Provenzano, 688 F.2d
194 (3d Cir.) (union officials' RICO convictions for soliciting bribes upheld exclusively on authority of Scotto), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1071 (1982); United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610 (2d
Cir. 1982) (relying on Scotto), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1174 (1983); United States v. Dozier, 672
F.2d 531, 544 n.9 (5th Cir.) (nexus complete when power of the office enables one to obtain, or at
least attempt to obtain, funds illegally), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 943 (1982).
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quate because it would punish acts that are clearly outside of RICO's
intended purview.
There are a variety of ways in which one's position within an enterprise can contribute to the commission of criminal acts. Consider three
examples: First, a low-level corporate executive embezzles $100 from
his firm on two separate occasions. Second, an employee of an enterprise sells narcotics to fellow employees whom he would not have met
but for his position with the enterprise. Finally, a union official uses
his power to obtain kickbacks from contractors in exchange for allowing construction to take place with nonunion labor. Under the
Scotto-Provenzano rule, all three of these acts may result in a finding of
a RICO violation because the perpetrator's position enables him to
commit the act.
However, these acts do not all deserve the same treatment under
RICO. While the union example is a clear RICO violation, 32 the first
two examples should not be within the purview of section 1962(c). The
drug dealer, although affiliated with the enterprise, made no use of the
enterprise. 33 Thus, the situation really does not involve the main impetus for and thrust of RIC0. 34 The small-time embezzler, while obviously using the enterprise to commit the acts, poses such a small
threat that the use of RICO would amount to unintended overkill. 35
Literally read, the test requires that the offense was possible
32. See United States v. Provenzano, 688 F.2d 194 (3d Cir.) (finding a violation on analogous
facts), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1071 (1982).
33. The example of the drug dealer can be analogized to the facts of United States v. Dennis,
458 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. Mo. 1978), ajfd., 625 F.2d 782 (8th Cir. 1980), where a RICO count was
dropped against a General Motors employee who had collected an unlawful debt from another
employee on General Motors property. The court held that there was no nexus between the
activities and conduct of the enterprise. 458 F. Supp. at 199. It arguably is possible to bring this
case under RICO on a "solely because of one's position" rationale.
34. See notes 67·81 infra and accompanying text.
35. Congress was well aware that the statute could encompass much more than organized
crime and could affect individuals, but felt that because of the complexity of the problem, a broad
and sweeping statute was needed. See McClellan, supra note 1. The Justice Department was
aware of RICO's breadth and assured Congress that they would concentrate on serious cases.
Atkinson, "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations," 18 U.S.C §§ 1961-68: Broadest of
the Federal Criminal Statutes, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 16 (1978). For the view that
the Justice Department has ignored its reassurances, see United States v. Ivie, 700 F.2d 51 (2d
Cir. 1983); Nagel & Flager, RICO, Past and Future: Some Observations and Conclusions, 52 U.
CIN. L. R.Ev. 456, 457-58 (1983).
The small-time embezzler should be distinguished from the large-scale embezzler for RICO
purposes. Congress was concerned with the criminal element bleeding firms of assets, and saw
this as one of La Cosa Nostra's most important tactics. See McClellan, supra note 1, at 141-42
(claiming there are approximately 200 syndicate-inspired bankruptcy schemes annually). The
executive who steals from "petty cash" does not pose the same threat to the enterprise and the
economy as the large embezzler. Furthermore, RICO is a "remedial" statute as opposed to a
"criminal" statute, i.e., it provides only new remedies, and does not create new substantive
crimest See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 16, at 1021 n.71. Therefore, it makes sense to limit
the remedies to.those crimes which were substantial enough to induce Congress to pass the Act.
For a further development of the possible relevance of size of the crime, see notes 100-03 infra
and accompanying text.
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''solely" because of the defendant's connection to the enterprise. This
would limit the application of RICO by excluding any case in which
factors other than "position," "involvement" or "control" contributed
to the defendant's commission of the racketeering activity. Because
neither the Scotto court nor the courts which have followed its approach have elaborated upon the rule, it is not clear if they intended to
so limit section 1962(c). Given the problems of proof that would arise
if courts were required to determine that the only enabling factor behind the racketeering was the defendant's position in the enterprise, 36
it is doubtful that "solely" was intended to add anything to the test.
The Scotto-Provenzano rule illustrates the difficulty that courts have
had in attempting to create a concise and lucid definition of the "nexus
requirement"; the concept has proven too elusive to be captured in a
small number of words.
2.

The ''Effect" Test

In United States v. Cauble, 37 the Fifth Circuit added to the ScottoProvenzano rule a requirement that "the predicate acts had some effect
on the legal enterprise." 38 This approach is another rigid definitional
formulation which presents two distinct problems: a failure to define
adequately its terms and a lack of attention to nonenterprise effects.
The court does not adequately define the term "effect," stating that
The effect may bedirect, such as the deposit of money in the enterprise's
bank account, or indirect, such as the retention of the enterprise's existing clients. The government need not prove that the racketeering ac36. If the "solely by virtue of his position" formulation were read literally, then a defendant
would have an incentive to claim that she was enabled to commit the acts for a number of
reasons outside of the enterprise. Read literally the test would require a search for causation
which would increase the burden of RICO litigation.
37. 706 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 996 (1984). ·
38. The test as fully articulated requires that
(1) the defendant has in fact committed the racketeering acts as alleged; (2) the defendant's
position in the enterprise facilitated his commission of the racketeering acts, and (3) the
predicate acts had some effect on the legal enterprise.
706 F.2d at 1333 (emphasis added). The first element of the rule adds nothing to the nexus
controversy since there is no issue if the defendant did not commit the acts. The second element
incorporates the first test of the Scotto-Provenzano rule and thus suffers from the same flaws that
plague that approach. See notes 30-36 supra and accompanying text The third element modifies
the Scotto-Provenzano rule itself, asserting that there should be an enterprise-racketeering nexus
in addition to the enterprise-defendant nexus.
This division of nexus into two distinct elements is neither helpful nor correct. The language
of§ 1962(c) does require a relationship between the enterprise and the defendant and the racketeering, but it does not follow that these should be analyzed as two distinct relationships as
opposed to one nexus. The same facts that are used to establish that the defendant conducted or
participated in the affairs of the enterprise should be used to prove this was done through a
pattern of racketeering activity. Essentially the court in Cauble is arguing that Scotto defined the
term "conduct or participate" but failed to define the term "through,'' which the Fifth Circuit
felt required an effect test Dividing § 1962 into a series of elements just adds to the confusion.
Only one issue needs to be addressed: did this defendant participate in the affairs of the alleged
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity?
"' •
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tivity "benefitted" or "advanced the affairs of" the enterprise. . . . The
prosecution need prove only that the racketeering acts affected the enterprise in some fashion. 3 9

This standard provides no means of distinguishing among the variety
of effects that racketeering may have on an enterprise. If any actual or
theoretical effect on an enterprise will satisfy the court, the requirement of effect adds nothing to the Scotto-Provenzano rule. For example, in the case of an employee selling narcotics to other employees,
the reputational damage caused by possible negative publicity could
qualify as an effect on the enterprise, as could a potential decline in
worker productivity due to drug use. Thus, the courts failure to define
the term "effect" renders it of little or no use.
In addition to failing to define "effect," the Fifth Circuit improperly ignored the important effects of criminal activity outside the organization itself. In passing RICO, Congress sought to combat the
infiltration of businesses by organized crime not only because of the
effects infiltration has on the enterprises themselves but also because of
the injuries to specific victims and the economic cost to the general
public. 40 RICO's civil remedies demonstrate its concern for victims as
well as its concern with the enterprise. 41 The Fifth Circuit's emphasis
on how the enterprise was affected runs the risk of ignoring the equally
important issue of how the racketeer utilized the enterprise to injure
others, regardless of the consequences to the enterprise.42 Neither the
enterprise nor its owners may be benefited or harmed if the enterprise
is used as a front for racketeering. However, in such a case the enter39. Cauble, 706 F.2d at 1333 n.24 (citations omitted).
40. Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose, Organized Crime Control Act of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970) provides in part:
(3) [T]his [organized crime's] money and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business and labor unions and to subvert and corrupt our democratic
processes; (4) organized crime activities in the United States weaken the stability of the
· Nation's economic system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations, interfere
with free competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce, threaten the domestic security, and undermine the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens.
41. The remedies section of RICO provides, among other things, a cause of action for "[a]ny
person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962." 18 U.S.C.
§ 1964(c) (1982).
·
42. A related, albeit short-lived, approach was put forth in United States v. Webster, 639
F.2d 174, 185-86 (4th Cir. 1981), modified on rehearing, 669 F.2d 185, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 857
(1982), which suggested that a nexus is established only when the enterprise is benefited, advanced, or promoted. The Fourth Circuit reversed its holding on rehearing, and rightfully so.
Like Cauble, Webster's focus on the effects for the enterprise is misplaced. The benefit requirement is an unwarranted narrowing of RICO because much racketeering activity, such as a union
official taking bribes, is detrimental to the enterprise and Congress was aware of this. See McClellan, supra note 1, at 141 (including in the evils of organized crime's infiltration of legitimate
enterprises the bleeding of a firm's assets and the selling of labor peace to employers). The
Webster approach has been rejected uniformly by all other courts. See, e.g., United States v.
Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1333 n.24 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 996 (1984); United
States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 990-91 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983);
United States v. Barber, 668 F.2d 778, 785 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 829 (1982); United
States"v.tWelch, 656 F.2d 1039, 1060-61 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982).

December 1984]

Note - RICO Nexus Requirement

581

prise plays a vital role in enhancing the racketeer's ability to injure her
victims. 43 Thus, the "effect" test is both too broad due to its ambiguity and too narrow in that it fails to encompass nonenterprise effects, a
significant concern of Congress in passing RICO.
3.

The ''Dictionary" Test

A third attempt at definition of the substantial relationship approach is found in United States v. Nerone. 44 In Nerone, the Seventh
Circuit defined the "nexus" by turning to Black's Law Dictionary for
the definition of the word "through." The court asserted that the
word's most logical meaning was that supplied by the dictionary,
which defined it as "by means of, in consequence of, by reason of."45
However, given the importance of the "nexus" to the determination of
the general scope of RICO, the extensive legislative history of the Organized Crime Control Act, and the confusion that has arisen in its
application, resorting to the dictionary is too simplistic to be appropriate. 46 The court is simply restating that section 1962(c) required a
nexus without defining the scope of the relationship.
In addition to its oversimplification, this approach was used by the
Nerone court to create an unwarranted distinction between conducting
the affairs of an enterprise by means of racketeering and conducting
the racketeering by means of an enterprise.47 The flaw with this distinction is that in a given fact situation, it is possible to describe the
43. United States v. Webster, 639 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1980), modified on rehearing, 669 F.2d
185 (1982), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 857 (1982), discussed in note 42 supra, provides an example of
the type of case where the focus on the "effect" on the enterprise is misplaced. In Webster a
nightclub was used as a front for a narcotics racket. On rehearing, the Fourth Circuit reversed
its benefit test in favor of a test examining how the enterprise facilitated the drug ring. This was
the crux of the case; the role of the enterprise was more important than the effect on the enterprise. One could imagine a fact situation similar to Webster in which there could be no benefit or
harm traceable to the enterprise. Given the role the nightclub in Webster played in the commission of the crimes, it seems unconscionable to claim there was no nexus because there was no
"effect."
44. 563 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951 (1978).
45. 563 F.2d at 851 (quoting BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1652 (rev. 4th ed. 1968)).
46. Relying on the dictionary definition implies that § 1962(c) can be dealt with by giving the
words their natural meaning. There is ample support for claiming that the parts of§ 1962(c)
that constitute the nexus requirement are too vague to justify a plain meaning approach. See
generally United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975, 990 (5th Cir. 1977) (acknowledging a conflict
over the nexus requirement and describing the language of § 1962(c) as "less than pellucid"),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 864 (1979); Tarlow, supra note 10, at 222-34 (discussing conflicting views
on the nexus requirement);Tarlow, supra note 6, at 371 (cases dealing with the nexus requirement
"have produced a number of ambiguous and conflicting tests to describe this relationship"). See
also Fordham & Leach, Interpretation ofStatutes in Derogation ofthe Common Law, 3 V AND. L.
REV. 438, 440 (1950) ("A court is not compelled by what appears to be a clear, literal interpretation to forego taking into account the common law or statutory background, the social matrix,
legislative history and the consequences of a literal interpretation . . . .").
47. Nerone involved an illegal gambling operation conducted by the owners.ofa mobile home
park. The chief link between the enterprise and the racketeering was that the mobile home park
was the situs of the gambling operation. The Seventh Circuit rejected the prosecution's attempt
to argue that the mobile home park was operated through a pattern of racketeering activity. The
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activity in either fashion. For example, if a union official uses collective bargaining talks to acquire kickbacks in exchange for union concessions, she has conducted her racketeering by means of the activities
of the union and she has also conducted the affairs of the union by
means of a pattern of racketeering activity. This is a classic RICO
violation, and it is ludicrous to confuse and complicate a RICO proceeding by allowing the parties to argue over a semantic distinction
that is more imaginary than real. The decisions relying on the Nerone
analysis seem to have found a distinction which can be used to dismiss
an action when in reality the decisions seem justifiable only on the
ground that the relationship really is just too attenuated in the particular case.48 Thus, the simplified and semantic "dictionary" test is inadequate to capture the complexities of RICO.
government argued that the park "existed in substantial part as a vehicle for applicants' illegal
gambling operation." The court replied that
[t]he only fair implication of this formulation is that [the defendants] conducted the casino
operation through the mechanism of the mobile park corporation. The Government further
asserts that the jury could reasonably conclude that [the defendants] "used the mobile home
park to house, promote, and conceal their illegal gambling operation." Once again, however, this statement can only be read as suggesting that the casino operation was advanced
through the instrumentality of the corporation.
Nerone, 563 F.2d at 851 (emphasis in original).
48. In United States v. Gibson, 486 F. Supp. 1230 (S.D. Ohio 1980), ajfd., 615 F.2d 825 (6th
Cir. 1982), a RICO count was dismissed against a union official who had misused union assets for
his own personal gain. The court acknowledged that under the Scotto-Provenzano rule, see text
at note 31 supra, the defendant would be held to have violated RICO. However, the court did
not believe that Congress had gone so far to encompass all embezzlement under RICO:
Admittedly, the racketeering activity at issue here is connected to the operation of the union
in the sense that Gibson would not have been able to accomplish the embezzlement of union
funds but for his position with the union. We must presume, however, that had Congress
desired to use RICO to prohibit all racketeering activity in connection with or through the
instrumentality of a legitimate enterprise, it would have done so expressly. In this connection, it is pertinent that RICO's legislative history reveals a congressional intention to eradi·
cate the infiltration of organized crime and racketeering into legitimate organizations, and
not, in particular, to reach all racketeering activity which has any connection with a legitimate enterprise.
486 F. Supp. at 1244. The court should have been content to stop at this point, see Part II infra,
but went on to cite Nerone and hold that the defendant conducted the racketeering through the
enterprise rather than vice versa. 486 F. Supp. at 1244. Throughout the opinion it is clear thut
the court is really concerned with the fact that the funds were used for personal reasons having
nothing to do with the union. See Engl v. Berg, 511 F. Supp. 1146, 1155 (E.D. Pa. 198l)(distinguishing Gibson on the ground that it was a case where the enterprise was merely a setting for the
racketeering activity). The court seems to seize on terminology to justify its decision that RICO
should not apply. In the reverse situation, Tarlow, supra note 6, at 294, suggests that "some
judges who are result oriented have strained to adopt broad constructions of RICO by ignoring
logical and theoretical consistency." LaFave and Scott have described this possibility of "result·
oriented" decision making:
There is something of a dispute among those who like to speculate on the workings of the
judicial mind as to whether courts first decide how a defective statute ought to be interpreted and then display whatever canons of statutory construction will make this interpreta·
tion look inevitable, or whether the courts actually first use the applicable canons and
second reach the result. Doubtless the truth lies somewhere in between - some judges are
apt to do it one way, some the other; some cases lend themselves to one technique, some to
the other.
W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 70 (1972) (footnote omitted).
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The "Manage or Operate" Test

In United States v. Mandel, 49 the Fourth Circuit sustained the dismissal of a RICO count because the defendant was not involved in
"the operation or management of [the] enterprise." 50 The act in question was the transfer of a business interest as a bribe. The court held
that this conduct did not amount to participation in the affairs of the
enterprise because a passive investment interest in the enterprise cannot satisfy the RICO "nexus" requirement. 5 1
Mandel can be criticized both for its. textual interpretation and its
reading of RICO's legislative history. The court essentially replaces
the statutory terms "conduct or participate" with the words "manage
or operate." However, the words are not synonymous, and "section
1962(c) makes no requirement that the person charged be entitled to
any particular degree of managerial responsibility. The statute provides only that "any person employed by or associated with' the corrupt enterprise shall be criminally liable." 52
Although the Mandel court purports to rely on legislative history, 53 its reasoning is incomplete. RICO and the Organized Crime
Control Act were passed because of the difficulty of convicting organized crime leaders who placed subordinates in control of the day-today affairs of an enterprise and passively reaped the profits. 54 However, important figures in organized crime who remain on the fringe of
the racketeering will escape prosecution if the defendant must manage
or operate the enterprise. While Mandel represents the narrowest limitation of "nexus" yet adopted, 55 the "manage or operate" approach
49. 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979), cen. denied. 445 U.S. 961 (1980).
50. 591 F.2d at 1374. The defendants in Mandel were the former governor of Maryland and
his associates. The court believed that its conclusion was mandated by the nexus requirement of
§ 1962(c):
[T]he word "through" in the statute . . . would seem to require proof of some connection
between the pattern of racketeering activity and the conducting or operating of the business.
Indeed, this connection must be shown if the word "through" is to have any meaning in the
statute. Without the word "through'', anyone who used income from a legitimate business
to participate in racketeering activity would be guilty of a violation of§ 1962(c). We do not
believe Congress meant to sweep so broadly . . . .
591 F.2d at 1375. Although the court's solution involves the redefinition of"conduct or participate,'' it is in essence an attempt to determine the scope of the nexus relationship. See note 13

supra.
51. 591 F.2d at 1376.
52. Note, supra note 11, at 781 (emphasis in original). For the text of§ 1962(c) see note 7

supra.
53. 591 F.2d at 1375 (stressing language in the congressional statement of purpose that
RICO proscribes "operation of any enterprise engaged in interstate co=erce through a 'pattern'
of 'racketeering activity.'" H. REP. No. 1549, 9lst Cong., 2d Sess. 35, reprinted in 1970 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News, 4007, 4010 (emphasis added).
54. See PERMANENT SUBCOMMrrrEE, supra note 5, at 2 (detailing how effectively "crime
chieftains" insulate themselves from the operations they control); McClellan, supra note l,_ at 5760 (describing the difficulty of convicting organized crime leaders).
55. See Tarlow, supra note 6, at 372 (characterizing the Mandel approach as the inost stringent standard).
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must be rejected because it reopens the hole in the enforcement "net"
that RICO was designed to fill.
5.

The ''Essential Function" Test

Another narrow approach is the "essential function" requirement
of United States v. Ladmer. 56 In Ladmer, the district court declined to
subject the defendants, who had misused union funds earmarked for
union conventions, to RICO because their acts related to activities
that were not essential union functions. 51 The court interpreted
RICO's provision for injunctive relief58 as evidence of congressional
concern with only the essential operations of an enterprise. 59
Although the Ladmer approach is commendable for its attempt to
examine the statute in its entirety in order to derive a standard, the
test is inadequate. First, the court fails to define the scope of the "essential functions" of an operation. Clearly the attendance of conventions by officials is not a prime function of a labor union. But unions
and large corporations engage in a multitude of activities and Ladmer
provides no standard for determining which are "essential" when the
case is less obvious. For example, if the union officials had misused
funds intended for the salaries of union officers, the court would be
forced to determine if paying salaries is an essential union function.
This is obviously a central function from the perspective of the individuals who receive this income, but the answer here is not apparent in
the absence of a more concrete definition.
Second, and more importantly, just as Mandel allowed fringe but
significant parties to escape RICO, Ladmer places activity which involves fringe but potentially important functions of an enterprise
outside of RIC0. 60 It would be anomalous to allow racketeers who
bankrupt a union by misusing convention funds, an extreme variation
of Ladmer's facts, to escape RICO sanctions. Nowhere in the legislative history is there support for the view that Congress was concerned
with anything less than the infiltration of enterprises in its broadest
sense. There are no qualifiers in the language of the statute or the
56..429 F. Supp. 1231 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
57. 429 F. Supp. at 1244.
58. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982).
59. The available remedies suggest that the statute is concerned with that which characterizes the conduct of the enterprise in question in its essential functions rather than irregularities committed in the course of otherwise lawful conduct of an enterprise. There is no
question that Congress intended to provide a remedy adequate to the evil visualized and in
that sense to enact broadly and inclusively.
429 F. Supp. at 1244.
60. An example of a case that would be difficult to reconcile under the Ladmer approach is
presented by United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), where the defendants
operated a theater legally but engaged in a number of fraudulent acts surrounding the enterprise's Chapter XI bankruptcy. The district court held that nothing in RICO requires the activity to be part of the "day-to-day" business operations of an enterprise. 461 F. Supp. at 786.
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legislative history to limit the scope of RICO to the infiltration of an
enterprise's essential functions. 61
While none of the judicial definitions discussed necessarily led to a
"wrong" decision in the cases in which they were adopted, their overor underinclusiveness threatens unacceptable and unintended results
unless courts modify or discard the tests in response to differing factual backgrounds. Ambiguity, the central problem running through
all these approaches, is the direct result of attempting to capture the
nexus requirement in a definitional word or phrase. The inadequacy
of the current judicial formulations suggests that the search for a rigid
test is futile and that the slipperiness of the nexus concept requires a
more flexible approach.
II.

AN

ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO THE "NEXUS"
REQUIREMENT

A standard approach to eliminating ambiguity and creating predictability is to create a black-letter rule. This might be the preferable
approach for the nexus requirement if it were possible. However, as
shown in Part I, the intended breadth of RIC0 62 makes the fashioning
of compact, yet comprehensive, definitions unfeasible. 63 The statute
itself is too ambiguous to guide courts faced with a nexus question, 64
yet the attempts at definition have proved to be equally vague or too
rigid.
Alternatively, courts could compare the fact situation before them
to a set of factors which usually indicate that the affairs of an enterprise are being conducted "through a pattern of racketeering." Factors would then provide courts with solid guidance on the issue of
when a defendant's activities are sufficiently related to the enterprise to
justify applying RICO, while allowing sufficient elasticity to distinguish fairly the variety of fact situations that arise. The use of factors
makes the discretion currently exercised by the courts explicit, yet simultaneously provides principles to inform the decision. Such a· flexible approach, with the structured discretion it vests in the courts, is
the best alternative that can be designed. 65
61. See United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 786 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (there are no
qualifiers in the statute on what constitutes the affairs of an enterprise).
62. For the view that RICO must be broad to deal with the threat of organized crime, see
McClellan, supra note 1. For a general discussion of the breadth of RICO see Atkinson, supra
note 35, at 4-15.
63. Indeed, McClellan, supra note 1, at 143, asserts that because of the wide variety of offenses committed by organized crime, "[i]t is impossible to draw an effective statute which
reaches most of the commercial activities of organized crime, yet does not include offenses commonly committed by persons outside organized crime as well."
64. See note 21 supra for a discussion of the potential constitutional problems this discretion
and ambiguity creates.
65. Further support for a flexible approach comes from the nature of the statute itself.
RICO is not a criminal statute; it does not make criminal conduct that before its enactment
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The Definitional Step

In order to determine what factors are relevant in establishing a
sufficient "nexus," we should examine the concerns that prompted
Congress to enact RICO. The meaning of "conducting or participating" in the affairs of an enterprise "through" a pattern of racketeering
cannot adequately be found in the broad language of section 1962(c).
A narrower definition does exist, however, in light of the "statutory
background, the social matrix, legislative history and the consequences
of a literal interpretation."66
Unquestionably Congress was concerned with the special threat
posed by organizational crime. 67 Organizational crime, of which orwas not already prohibited, since its application depends on the existence of "racketeering
activity" that violates an independent criminal statute. In addition, its standards of unlawful, le., criminal or civil, conduct are sanctioned by both criminal and civil remedies.
RICO, in short, is a "remedial" statute.
Blakey & Gettings, supra note 16, at 1021 n.71 (citations omitted). If RICO is indeed a "civil
remedies" statute, then the need for black-letter rules is lessened; remedies have traditionally
been subject to judicial discretion. See NATIONAL AssOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL,
CoMMITIBE ON THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE USE OF CIVIL REMEDIES IN OR·
GANIZED CRIME CoNTROL 6-7 (1977) (discussing the advantages of the greater flexibility of civil
remedies).
By allowing for flexibility, the approach presented in this Note is subject to claims of vagueness similar to those made against the current judicial forumlae. The crucial difference, however,
is that the approach advocated here attempts to make the judicial discretion inherent in the
provision explicit and principled. It is an unfortunate fact of the RICO nexus requirement that it
is not susceptible to black-letter definitions. The use of a flexible factor approach, while not
capable of completely eliminating vagueness, is a preferable "second best" strategy.
66. Fordham & Leach, supra note 46, at 440. See also United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193, 201 (1979) (It is a "familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and
yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.")
(quoting Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)).
RICO's liberal interpretation provision, Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 941, 947 (1970), is not a bar to seeking a limited approach to RICO
since the provision provides that RICO is to be liberally construed in light of its remedial purpose. The point of the approach advocated in this Note is to demonstrate that the remedial
purpose of RICO as reflected in the nexus requirement is narrower than the literal language of
the statute.
67. Organizational crime can be viewed as the general criminal use of any organization. Organized crime is a specific type of organizational crime where the organization utilized exists only
for criminal purposes. It is undisputable that the debates in Congress over Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act were specifically concerned with the infiltration of legitimate businesses
by organized crime, specifically La Cosa Nostra and the effect this was having on society and the
economy. See McClellan, supra note 1, at 59. See generally Statement of Findings and Purpose,
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922-923 (1970):
The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from
America's economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption;
(2) organized crime derives a major portion of its power through money obtained from such
illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan sharking, the theft and fencing of property,
the importation and distribution of narcotics and other dangerous drugs, and other forms of
social exploitation; (3) this money and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt
legitimate business and labor unions and to subvert and corrupt our democratic processes;
(4) organized crime activities in the United States weaken the stability of the Nation's economic system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations, interfere with free
competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce, threaten the domestic security, and undermine the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens; and (5) organized
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ganized crime is but a subset, can be viewed as any utilization of a
crime continues to grow because of defects in the evidence-gathering process of the law
inhibiting the development of the legally admissible evidence necessary to bring criminal
and other sanctions or remedies to bear on the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime and because the sanctions and remedies available to the Government are unnecessarily limited in scope and impact.
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United
States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new
penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the
unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime.
The legislative history of Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act (RICO) is not terribly
helpful. Most of it, like the Statement of Purpose, reflects a general congressional concern with
the growing power of organized crime. See notes 1-4 supra and accompanying text. See also
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 492 (2d Cir. 1984) (referring to the "clanging
silence of the legislative history" in discussing private civil remedies), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct.
901 (1985).
RICO was not, however, written in the narrow terms of the congressional debate and some
weight must be given to the decision to draft the statute in general terms. Congress had to avoid
phrasing the statute in terms of organized crime and La Cosa Nostra. First, the use of such
terms would have subjected the statute to attack as unconstitutionally vague because the definition of organized crime would be so elusive. See Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 548 F.
Supp. 20, 22 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
Second, the burden of proving the existence of an organized criminal structure was one of the
problems that RICO was designed to eliminate. Including the term "organized crime" in the
statute would have further invited courts to require a link with organized crime, resulting in
another loophole for crime bosses to slip through.
Despite this policy and overwhelming contrary precedent, a few district courts have dismissed civil cases on the ground that no tie to organized crime was alleged. See Noonan v.
Granville Smith, 537 F. Supp. 23, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (nothing in case involves infiltration by
organized crime); Adair v. Hunt Intl. Resources Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736, 747 (N.D. Ill. 1981)
(must be involved with " 'organized crime' or activities within the penumbra of that phrase");
Barr v. WUl/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (must be a member of "a society of
criminals operating outside of the law"). Most circuit (as well as district) court cases have rejected this view. See, e.g., Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1353 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 104 S.
Ct. 509 (1983); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1063 (8th Cir. 1982), affd. in part, reversed in
part on rehearing en bane, 710 F.2d 1361, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 527 (1983); United States v.
Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 303 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); United States v.
Gibson, 486 F. Supp. 1230, 1240-41 (S.D. Ohio 1980), affd., 675 F.2d 825 (6th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Chovanec, 467 F. Supp. 41, 44-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). The practice of requiring a link
with organized crime has only arisen in civil cases despite the fact that the substantive offenses
outlined in § 1962 are the same for both criminal and civil RICO. Theoretically, the same standards should apply in either type of suit. See Tarlow, supra note 6, at 302 & n.35. Furthermore,
the organized crime requirement can find no authority within the language of statute, Barr, 66
F.R.D. at 112-13, or in the legislative history.
The curious objection has been raised to S.30 as a whole, and to several of its provisions in
particular, that they are not somehow limited to organized crime - as if organized crime
were a precise and operative legal concept, like murder, rape, or robbery. Actually, of
course, it is a functional or sociological concept like white collar or street crime, serving
simply as a shorthand method of referring to a large and varying group of individual criminal offenses committed in diverse circumstances.
116 CONG. REC. 35,344 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Poll).
Although the terms "organized crime" or "organized criminal activity" were not used, RICO
is designed specifically to combat organized crime. The definition of racketeering activity in
§ 1961 and the substantive provision of§ 1962 sufficiently encompassed the ''symptoms" of organized crime's activities to avoid a severe overinclusivity problem.
It is self-defeating to attempt to exclude from any list of offenses such as that found in title
IX all offenses which commonly are committed by persons not involved in organized crime.
Title IX's list does all that can be expected . . . it lists offenses committed by organized
crime with substantial frequency, as part of its commercial operations.
McClellan, supra note 1, at 144; Measures Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings on S. 30
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bureaucratic or corporate-like structure. It is this exploitation of an
infrastructure that increases the threat a racketeer poses to society.
Therefore, the required linkage between the racketeering and the enterprise should be viewed as a requirement that the defendant utilize
the organizational structure provided by the enterprise. 68
There are a number of reasons for this special concern with the
utilization of an enterprise or organizational structure to further criminal goals. Legal or illegal behavior is always more effective when carBefore the Subcom. on Criminal Laws and Procedures ofthe Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 405 (1969) (letters by the Department of Justice suggesting improvements in
§ 1961(1)(A) that would still keep the provision "broad enough to include most state statutes
customarily invoked against organized crime.").
The definition of what constitutes racketeering activity is contained in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)
(1976) which provides:
(1) "[R]acketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping,
gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous
drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more thart
one year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18,
United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery),
sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from
interstate shipment) if the act indictable under section 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating
to embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sections 891-894 (relating to extortionate
credit transactions), section 1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling information),
section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), section 1503
(relating to obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement), section
1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating
to racketeering), section 1953 (relating to interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund payments), section 1955 (relating to the
prohibition of illegal gambling businesses), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate
transportation of stolen property), sections 2341-2346 (relating to trafficking in contraband
cigarettes), sections 2421-24 (relating to white slave traffic), (C) any act which is indictable
under title 29, United States Code, section 186 (dealing with restrictions on payments and
loans to labor organizations) or section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds),
or (D) any offense involving fraud connected with a case under title 11, fraud in the sale of
securities, or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of
the United States.
Thus, while RICO's scope extends beyond organized crime, this does not imply that the
statute is completely divorced from any limitations arising from its roots or the organized crime
concept. The language of§ 1962(c) and the legislative history should be read together to establish a general concern with organizational crime, a concept encompassing all the dangers associated with organized crime, see notes 69-77 infra and accompanying text, while flexible enough to
eliminate the problems of proof associated with the limiting of the statute's application to criminal syndicates.
68. Requiring a showing that the defendant utilized the enterprise in his racketeering activities is from one point of view a reversal of the language of§ 1962(c), which states that it is
unlawful "to conduct or participate . . • in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a
pattern ofracketeering activity." See United States v. Nerone, 563 F.2d 836, 851 (7th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951 (1978). While the criticism may be semantically valid, it lacks true
substance. It is possible to describe any fact situation using either semantic formulation. Phrasing the nexus requirement in terms of "utilizing the orga..11izational structure" has no effect on the
breadth of RICO. See notes 44-48 supra and accompanying text. Furthermore, the test herein
proposed provides an accurate description of the remedial purpose of§ 1962(c), whereas blind
adherence to the words of the statute would frustrate that purpose. See notes 69-82 infra and
accompanying text.
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ried out by a group of persons, 69 but a qualitative leap in power and
efficiency occurs when a group has the benefit of bureaucratic structure or infrastructure. 7° Certain advantages, such as the ability of the
entity to outlive any of its individual members, 71 the replacement of
informal personal relations with structured status ties, 72 and the efficiency of centralized impersonal decision making acquired by separation offunctions73 accrue to varying degrees when a group develops or
co-opts a structure. 74
Furthermore, while the individual racketeer attempting to further
her goals through the utilization of the enterprise's organization may
not benefit directly from the advantages of bureaucratization, she does
benefit indirectly. Position within an enterprise resulting from
bureaucratization provides one with a status that conveys more power
than inherently resides with the individual. 75 The president of a union
69. See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 448-49 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)
("[T]o unite, back of a criminal purpose, the strength, opportunities and resources of many is
obviously more dangerous and more difficult to police than the efforts of a lone wrongdoer.").
See also Brickey, supra note 16, at 442-44 (1983).
70. Wheeler & Rothman, The Organization as Weapon In White-Collar Crime, 80 MICH. L.
REV. 1403 (1982), use statistical and sociological data to prove that the organization is to the
white-collar criminal what the gun is to the street - "a tool to obtain money from victims." Id.
at 1406. Their data shows a significant increase in the gravity of certain typical white-collar
crimes when the defendant utilized a formal organization. See note 99 infra. See generally K.
BOULDING, THE ORGANIZATIONAL REVOLUTION: A STUDY IN THE ETHICS OF EcONOMIC
ORGANIZATION (1953). There are two important ways for a criminal to obtain an organization.
First a criminal syndicate may develop from within as La Cosa Nostra grew out of the "centuries
old Sicilian terrorist society, the Mafia." See PERMANENT SuscoMMlTIEE, supra note 5, at 117.
Second, a criminal organization, a single racketeer or a group of racketeers may co-opt an existing legitimate enterprise. RICO was in theory designed to deal with the second of these possibilities. See Statement of Findings and Purpose, Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922-23 (1970).
The decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981), brought
the first type of organization within RICO's scope. Turkette extended RICO coverage to illegitimate as well as legitimate enterprises on the theory that if Congress had intended to limit the
definition of enterprise to legitimate organizations it could have inserted the term legitimate in
§ 1961(4). 452 U.S. at 580-81. The Turkette decision makes sense in light of the general congressional concern with organized crime. It would seem nonsensical to allow an underworld
figure to escape the punishment of RICO by claiming that he was conducting only the affairs of
the mob. Turkette left open the issue of whether the enterprise must have an ascertainable structure apart from the racketeering activity. See note 16 supra.
71. The Committee on the Judiciary has found that unlike the criminal gangs of the past,
organized crime now functions regardless of individual personnel changes, like a sophisticated
corporation. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1969).
72. See K. BOULDING, supra note 70, at 26 (discussing how organizations grow by replacing
"informal" communication which characterizes the family with more structured ties).
73. See K. BOULDING, supra note 70, at 34. Boulding also discusses "the power of organization to release new sources of energy" and to increase the productivity of time and energy devoted to organizations. Id. at 32.
74. Not all possible RICO enterprises fall under the classic corporate-bureaucratic model
discussed in K. BOULDING, supra note 70. However, it is reasonable to assume that most enterprises do possess some of these unique advantages that distinguish them from a person acting on
his own behalf for legitimate or illegitimate goals. Even the Mom and Pop grocery store can be
more efficient than the pushcart peddler.
75. See K. BOULDING, supra note 70, at 18-20 (commenting on the need for "sta.tus" and
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is powerful because she is president, not because she, as an individual,
merits that degree of respect. In addition to status, an organization
can provide the individual with a complex structure that prevents detection of criminal activity,76 facilities to be exploited for criminal purposes and a potential pool of witting or unwitting compatriots in the
form of people who have adopted the organization's value system.77
The racketeer or group of racketeers who create or utilize an enterprise acquire an organizational power that separates their criminality
from the ordinary, thus necessitating special statutory treatment
through RICO.
Congressional concern for racketeer utilization of organizational
structure, and thus organizational power, can be gleaned from the
content of RICO itself. First, section 1962(c) subjects racketeering activities to the severe sanctions of RICO only if affiliated in some manner with an enterprise. 78 Second, RICO's remedies emphasize
separating the criminal element from the enterprise's structure. The
injunctions provided for in section 196479 allow the court, in the process of punishing the defendant, to dissolve the organization that the
defendant utilized or to prevent the defendant from gaining access to a
similar organization. Likewise, the forfeiture provision of section
1963, 80 which provides for the total removal of the racketeer's influhow the organization provides this and can improve it). See also id. at xxxiii (discussing the
organization's necessity for hierarchy resulting in a "highly stratified society of status").
76. See note S supra (discussing the difficulty of detection with the highly sophisticated structure of organized crime).
77. K. BOULDING, supra note 70, at 8-10 (discussing how an individual's value system is
molded by an organization); w. WHYTE, JR., THE ORGANIZATION MAN (1956) (discussing how
American society indoctrinates its people to assume their place in an organizational world). Part
of the obedience of subordinates comes from what Boulding refers to as the "two-sidedness of
organizations."
Many of the dilemmas are created by the fact that organization is on the one hand an
expression of solidarity within the organized group, and on the other an expression of a Jack
of solidarity with those outside the organization. Organization, in other words, may tend to
accentuate the division between an "in-group" and an "out-group." Almost every organization, therefore, exhibits two faces - a smiling face which it turns towards its members and a
frowning face which it turns to the world outside.
K. BOULDING, supra note 70, at 10. The loyalty to and sense of belonging derived from an
organization can be exploited by the racketeer to get subordinates to go along with activity to
which they may be morally opposed. Id. at 10-12.
78. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982).
79. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982), provides:
(a) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent and restrain
violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate orders, including, but not
limited to: ordering any person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in any
enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or investments of any
person, including, but not ljmited to, prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type
of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of which affect interstate or foreign
commerce; or ordering dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise, making due provision for the rights of innocent persons.
80. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1982), provides:
(c) Upon conviction of a person under this section, the court shall authorize the Attorney
General to seize all property or other interest declared forfeited under this section upon such
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ence from the enterprise, acknowledges that organized crime is capable of outliving the incarceration of its individual members. 81
The extent to which the defendant utilizes the organizational structure or infra-structure of the alleged enterprise to further the racketeering activity is what the nexus requirement involves. Utilization
requires that the enterprise be more than a context for criminal activity. To be "utilized" the enterprise must be a "weapon" of the racketeer;82 it must enhance the ability to commit the crime. This standard
is the first step in developing a "flexible" approach.
B.

The "Characteristics" of Utilization of an Enterprise.

The standard for establishing a nexus set out above - utilization
of organizational structure - is an ambiguous definitional test which
cannot be successfully applied without encountering problems similar
to those that plague current judicial approaches. The approach advocated here is the same as that used by Congress in the face of the vague
concept of organized crime: the best way to identify the utilization of
the enterprise is to look for its symptoms. 83 The characteristics of exploitation of an organizational structure to which a court should look
can be derived from the advantages which an infrastructure offers the
criminal, the elements of organized crime that troubled Congress and
the policy considerations which underlie RICO. No single characteristic is necessarily sufficient to sustain a determination of a substantial
nexus. The importance of any factor will vary depending on the facts
of a given case. The factfinder must examine the factors as evidence of
utilization of organizational structure in order to determine whether
the organization was used "as a weapon" by the racketeer.
First, the court should inquire whether the type of criminal activity in question requires or is generally associated with an enterprise.
When an enterprise is a prerequisite for the commission of the crime
the inquiry is simplified. For example, the bankruptcy scheme of
United States v. DePalma 84 could not occur without the enterprise. In
terms and conditions as the court shall deem proper. If a property right or other interest is
not exercisable or transferable for value by the United States, it shall expire, and shall not
revert to the convicted person. All provisions oflaw relating to the disposition of property,
or the proceeds from the sale thereof, or the remission or mitigation of forfeitures for violation of the customs Jaws, and the compromise of claims and the award of compensation to
informers in respect of such forfeitures shall apply to forfeitures incurred, or alleged to have
been incurred, under the provisions of this section, insofar as applicable and not inconsistent
with the provisions hereof. Such duties as are imposed upon the collector of customs or any
other person with respect to the disposition of property under the customs Jaws shall be
performed under this chapter by the Attorney General. The United States shall dispose of
all such property as soon as commercially feasible, making due provision for the rights of
innocent persons.
81. See note 71 supra.
82. See generally Wheeler & Rothman, supra note 70.
83. See note 67 supra.
84. 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). In DePalma the defendants successfully denied inves-
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contrast, many fact situations involve crimes that are not inherently
enterprise crimes, such as murder or arson. 85 If the crimes involved
are "enterprise" crimes, arguably the inquiry need proceed no further
since the nexus is established within the definition of the criminal
activity. 86
Second, a court should consider the defendant's position in the enterprise and the extent to which it furthered the racketeering activity.
Of particular relevance here are access to organizational structure and
power and the use of status to further criminal purposes. The higher
the position within the organization, the more likely it is that the defendant had at her disposal the appurtenances of organizational structure, including the possibility of access to the enterprise's financial
resources and/or books, 87 access to inside information, or a degree of
control over facilities and subordinates. 88 The factfinder can examine
position within the enterprise to determine whether the defendant had
the ability to channel the organizational power of the enterprise to
illegitimate ends. In addition, position can provide status or recognitional power which can be used for criminal purpose. 89 This situation
arises frequently in cases involving bribery of police officers or union
offi.cials; 90 the defendant uses the power the organizational structure
confers in the form of status. The factfinder should also determine
whether the defendant relied on her organizational status to commit
the crimes; position itself is not necessarily determinative. 91 A hightors their share of the assets of a corporation in Chapter XI bankruptcy by "skimming" assets
from the corporation and successfully hiding them in anticipation of bankruptcy. 461 F. Supp. at
797-98.
85. Murder and arson are made predicate acts in 18 U.S.C. § 196l(l)(A) (1982).
86. There may still be policy reasons for not considering the nexus established solely by
"enterprise" crimes. For example, this Note argues that one of the factors that should be considered is the magnitude of the criminal acts. See notes 99-103 infra and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., United Sates v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (In order to skim
off assets to prevent creditors from claiming them in Chapter XI bankruptcy proceedings, the
defendants utilized their power as directors of the corporation to alter the books and move
assets.).
88. See note 77 supra.
89. See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
90. See, e.g., United States v. Provenzano, 688 F.2d 194 (3d Cir.) (union official soliciting
bribes so truckers could violate Teamster's "city man" rule), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1071 (1982);
United States v. Sanzo, 673 F.2d 64 (2d Cir.) (union official accepting kickback so nonunion
labor could be employed), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858 (1982); United States v. Dozier, 672 F.2d
531 (5th Cir.) (Louisiana Commissioner of Agriculture soliciting and accepting bribes), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 943 (1982); United States v. Barber, 668 F.2d 778 (4th Cir. 1982) (head of West
Virginia Alcohol Beverage Control Commission accepting bribes), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 829
(1982); United States v. Welch, 656 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1981) (sheriff receiving bribes to protect
gambling), cert denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982).
91. This factor is related to the approach embodied in the Scotto-Provenzano formulation, see
notes 30-36 supra and accompanying text, but differs in the important sense that the defendant's
position is a consideration rather than a rigid test. There are cases where the importance of the
use of organization status alone calls for the finding of a nexus. In this type of case the ScottoProvenzano rule yields the same result as the flexible approach. However, in a less obvious case
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ranking position provides the racketeer with advantages. While this
factor indicates what those advantages are, 92 the factfinder must determine if they were in fact utilized.
Third, the court should determine the extent to which the enterprise served to complicate detection. Even if an enterprise was not
used to facilitate the criminal activity, the organizational structure can
make a major contribution to the racketeering effort by providing a
"cover." Bureaucracy makes law enforcement more difficult; it allows the separation of decision making from implementation, making
it much harder to find and convict the leaders of organized crime. 93
When a legitimate enterprise is involved, detection is complicated by
the ability to use the enterprise as a cover for racketeering activity and
to "launder" funds through the enterprise.94 Finally, the sheer complexity of the entity that can be achieved through a corporate structure
makes detection difficult. This is the case with La Casa Nostra where
determining and then proving who was involved in wliat activity has
proved most intractable. 95
The extent to which the enterprise provided a front or served to
complicate detection is relevant on policy as well as on practical
grounds. RICO was passed in part to bolster the existing criminal law
in obtaining convictions where detection was difficult. 96 This factor is
designed to help effectuate the congressional concern with the use of
the enterprise to mask racketeering.
Fourth, the use of physical facilities of the enterprise is an obvious
indication of the utilization of the enterprise. However, the use of enterprise facilities is the least reliable symptom of the existence of the
where the defendant did not rely on his organizational status power as the only mechanism for
committing the racketeering, the ambiguity and rigidity of the Scotto-Provenzano test make it an
inferior approach.
92. In using someone's position in the enterprise as an indicator of their ability to utilize the
organizational structure the nature of the racketeering is important. A financial crime such as
securities fraud would require a high level management position. In contrast, while a foreman
with authority over employees could be guilty of using organizational structure to run numbers,
her position as a foreman only makes it more likely that she utilized the enterprise. She could in
fact be utilizing personal or mob ties to get cooperation of the employees. Other factors would
have to be considered to determine if she relied in fact on her organizational status.
93. See PERMANENT SUBCOMMITrEE, supra note 5 (discussing the ability of "crime chieftains" to insulate themselves from actual implementation).
94. Wheeler and Rothman found that "organizational" offenders are able to break the law
more often and for longer durations than individual offenders. See Wheeler & Rothman, supra
note 70, at 1410-11.
This is quite consistent with other findings in our general research program which emphasize the ability to "hide" an offense within the interstices of organization and through elusive
manipulation of paper, making it easier for relatively sophisticated crimes to continue undetected for a longer period and to occur with greater frequency.
Id. at 1412-13.
95. See PERMANENT SUBCOMMITIEE, supra note 5.
96. See Statement of Findings and Purpose, Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 Pub. L.
No. 91-462, 84 Stat. 922-23 (1970). See also McClellan, supra note 1, at 59-60 (discussing how
RICO was intended to fill the gaps in the present law enforcement net).
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nexus. Use of facilities does not necessarily mean that the existence of
the enterprise in some way enhanced the criminal activity, but extensive use of the facilities can be evidence that the enterprise was merely
a front for illegal activity. 97 Even if the enterprise is not a front, the
use of enterprise facilities could be so vital to the criminal acts that a
nexus is established. In this situation the nature of the facilities is as
important as the degree of use; to the extent the enterprise provides
facilities which are not commonly obtainable, it substantially enhances
the racketeering. 98
Finally, the scope and gravity of the offenses should be considered
by the court. Professors Wheeler and Rothman have studied the effects of utilizing an organization on white-collar crime. Their results
reveal that the crimes of "organizational offenders" are of a significantly longer duration, involve a larger geographic scope, are more
sophisticated, and net a great deal more money than those of "individual offenders." 99 While statistical studies are not necessarily the best
97. Compare United States v. Dennis, 458 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. Mo. 1978), ojfd., 625 F.2d 782
(8th Cir. 1980), with United States v. Webster, 669 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1982), modifying on rehear·
ing, 639 F.2d 174 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 857 (1982). In Dennis a General Motors em·
ployee collected unlawful debts on General Motors property. The court held that although the
defendant was an employee and utilized the premises of the corporation to carry out his scheme,
this was not enough to establish a nexus between the enterprise and the defendant's racketeering
activity. In Webster the Fourth Circuit focused on the extensive use of a nightclub's facilities by
a narcotics ring in determining that there was a sufficient nexus between the nightclub and the
racketeering.
Evidence introduced at the trial tended to show that, by means of the telephone company's
call-forwarding service, telephone calls to Webster's and Thompson's home telephone
(which was tapped by court order) were frequently forwarded to the telephone at the 1508
Club; that Club facilities and personnel were used to accept and relay narcotics related
messages; and that, on at least one occasion, a Club employee was asked by Webster to
provide Club-owned drinks to one of Webster's narcotics customers who was waiting for
drugs to be brought so that a transaction could take place. The evidence which the govern·
ment has offered as sustaining the convictions under subsection (c) indicates that the facilities of the 1508 Club were regularly made available to, and put in the service of, the
defendants' drug dealing business.
669 F.2d at 187 (citation omitted) (quoting Webster, 639 F.2d at 183, 184).
98. When the enterprise merely provides facilities such as cars, telephones, a place to make
deliveries or any other easily obtainable item, the enterprise has not enhanced the threat posed by
the racketeers, but has simply provided a convenient source of "supplies." Extensive use of
ordinary facilities can be evidence that the enterprise was a front. See note 97 supra. To establish a nexus, when the enterprise is not a front, the facilities of the enterprise utilized should
provide the racketeer with power he would not have if acting completely outside the enterprise.
For instance, some enterprises can provide facilities that are unique. See, e.g.. United States v.
Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1983) (defendants made extensive use of enterprise's boats,
plane, cattle ranch and bank account to further a drug smuggling operation), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 996 (1984).
99. See Wheeler & Rothman, supra note 70, at 1410-19. For example, the amount netted by
"individual offenders" for the crimes studied had a median of $7,623 and a mean of $74,585. For
"occupational offenders" the median was $8,018 and the mean $135,011. For "organizational
offenders" the median was $387,274 and the mean was $1,077,432. Id. at 144. Wheeler and
Rothman also discuss the possibility of using the characteristics of organizational crime as warning signs for this type of crime. Id. at 1425-26.
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basis for a judicial rule, there are strong policy reasons for considering
the scope of the crime as an indicator of a nexus. ·
The statistics suggest that the unusually large magnitude of a particular crime may indicate utilization of an organizational structure.
For example, the small embezzler who pilfers petty cash does not utilize the organization to the same extent as the large-scale embezzler. 100
Congress drafted RICO to get at large-scale cases; it was not intended
to get at "Mom and Pop" criminal acts. 101 Although it is not binding
legal precedent, the Justice Department's promise not to "power rape
nickel and dime cases" 102 should be used as a guide to the intended
scope of RICO. Use of a magnitude factor would incorporate that
intent into the law itself, instead of leaving it to the promises of prosecutors.103 The judiciary should keep the crimes allowed to fall under
RICO in line with the punishments provided by the statute. One way
to effectuate this policy is to treat magnitude of the crime as an indicator of utilization of an organization. It is important to note that severity of the crime should not be determinative of a RICO violation, but
only used as one factor to establish a nexus. Likewise, if all other characteristics point to actual utilization of the organizational structure,
scope of the crime should not eclipse the evidence of a nexus.
CONCLUSION

This Note has argued against the conventional approaches to
RICO's "nexus requirement" because of their ambiguity and their unwarranted attempts to limit the statutory language with rigid definitions. The "nexus requirement" should be viewed as the final
determination of whether section 1962(c) applies. Given the existence
of an enterprise and a pattern of racketeering activity, the issue becomes whether the two elements are sufficiently related to warrant a
conviction. The best approach to making this determination is a flexible one focusing on the extent to which the parties utilized the organizational or bureaucratic structure of the enterprise. Flexibility is
100. Embezzlement is an "enterprise" crime, so by definition there can be no question of a
racketeering-enterprise nexus. However, there are different degrees of embezzlement based on
their gravity; the greater the amount embezzled, or, more generally, the greater the magnitude of
the crime, the more extensive the use of the organizational structure must be.
101. See McClellan, supra note 1, at 141-45 (answering American Civil Liberties Union objection to RICO's potential breadth by arguing that the definition of racketeering in § 1961(1)
and the concept of a pattern limits RICO's application to the large-scale crimes characteristic of
La Cosa Nostra); cf. United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647, 659 (8th Cir.) ("We are satisfied that
RICO was not designed to serve as a recidivist statute, imposing heavier sentences for crimes
which are already punishable under other statutes. The Act was not intended to be a catchall
reaching all concerted action of two or more criminals involving two or more of the designated
crimes."), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1040 (1982).
102. Atkinson, supra note 35, at 16 (quoting John Dowd, chief of the Justice Department
task force in charge of RICO cases in 1977). The Courts have also cautioned prosecutors against
aggressive use of RICO. See note 12 supra.
103. See Tarlow, supra note 10, at 176-77.
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maintained by concentrating on certain indicators of the defendant's
use of the enterprise rather than on rigid definitions. This approach
allows for principled judicial discretion that emphasizes the remedial
purposes of the statute, and this can provide a meaningful limitation
on RICO.

